


Patterns of Political Ideology and Security Policy

TIM HAESEBROUCK

Ghent University

AND

PATRICK A. MELLO 

University of Erfurt

Recent studies on political ideology suggest the existence of partisan divides on matters of foreign and security policy, challenging the notion that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” However, when taken as a whole, extant work provides decidedly mixed evidence of party-political differences outside domestic politics. This article first conducts a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between parties’ left–right positions and their general attitude toward peace and security missions, which suggests that right-leaning parties tend to be more supportive of military operations. Yet, the results also show that the empirical pattern is *curvilinear*: centrist and center–right parties witness the highest level of support for military missions, while parties on both ends of the political spectrum show substantially less support. The second part of our analysis examines whether the stronger support of rightist parties for peace and security missions translates into a greater inclination of right-wing governments to actually deploy forces for military operations. Strikingly, our results suggest that leftist governments were actually more inclined to participate in operations than their right-leaning counterparts. The greater willingness of left-wing executives to deploy military forces is the result of their greater inclination to participate in operations with inclusive goals.

Introduction

Recent studies on political ideology suggest the existence of partisan divides on matters of foreign and security policy, thereby challenging the traditional notion that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” However, as highlighted in the introduction to this special issue (Raunio and Wagner 2020), there is a lack of systematic empirical work on political parties in foreign and security policy. Moreover, extant work provides decidedly *mixed evidence* of party-political differences outside domestic politics. Some studies indicate the existence of ideological differences between

Tim Haesebrouck is a post-doctoral researcher at Ghent University, Belgium. His research interests include military intervention, defense burden sharing, the Responsibility to Protect, and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. His work has been published in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, and *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*.

Patrick A. Mello is Visiting Scholar at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt. His research focuses on the domestic politics of international security and qualitative research methods, on which he is currently completing the book *Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Research Design and Application* (Georgetown University Press). He is also the author of *Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict* (Palgrave Macmillan). His recent work has appeared in journals such as the *European Journal of International Security*, *Contemporary Security Policy*, and the *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*.

Haesebrouck, Tim, and Patrick A. Mello. (2020) Patterns of Political Ideology and Security Policy. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, doi: 10.1093/fpa/oraa006

© The Author(s) (2020). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial reuse, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com

political parties on the use of military force, and others provide evidence that party-political differences also have an impact on military deployment decisions. Yet, large-N studies on the link between government ideology and the use of force generally do not focus on the post-Cold War period, when the frequency of military operations increased, and their goals changed substantially. Research on specific military operations indicates that the effects of partisanship do not apply equally to all cases of military deployment: while right-wing governments might be more inclined to support operations deployed to defend narrow national interests, left-leaning executives seem to be more supportive of operations with inclusive goals such as humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, whether or not the context of the operation has an impact on the effect of government ideology has not yet been explored in a systematic fashion.

In this paper, we aim to fill these substantial gaps in the literature by providing a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between ideological positions of political parties and support for military deployment across twenty-four European countries. Hence, in line with the aims of this special issue, the paper tests the first, second, and sixth hypothesis outlined in [Raunio and Wagner \(2020\)](#), specifically exploring whether (1) support for military operations is greater among right-leaning parties, (2) there is cross-party consensus on humanitarian military interventions, and (3) left governments are less inclined to actually use military force.

In line with the introduction, we consider the examination of party positions and their actual impact on government policy as interrelated but separate questions. In the first part of our analysis, we examine the relationship between various indicators of political ideology and the *general support* for peace and security operations as indicated in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; [Bakker et al. 2015](#)). The second part of our analysis focuses on actual *military deployment decisions* and examines the relationship between government ideology on a left–right scale and participation in eight military operations, drawing on a newly created data set. To estimate party-political positions, we use data from two widely used alternative sources: the 2010 and 2014 versions of the CHES data set and corresponding data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; [Budge et al. 2001](#); [Klingemann et al. 2006](#)).

The results of the first part of our analysis largely confirm our theoretical expectation that right-leaning parties are generally more supportive of the use of force than left-leaning parties. Yet, contrary to widely held assumptions about a linear relationship between political ideology and support for military missions, we show that the empirical pattern is *curvilinear*, which also resonates with recent work done by [Wagner et al. \(2017, 2018\)](#). This means that centrist parties and center–right parties show the highest level of support for military operations, whereas support levels drop on the far-left and far-right sides of the political spectrum.

However, the second part of our analysis shows that right-wing governments are not more inclined to actually *deploy* forces for military operations. Not only is the relationship between ideology and support for military operations less pronounced when looking at military deployment decisions, but also our results suggest that leftist governments decided more often in favor of military operations than their right-leaning counterparts. Examining *different types* of military operations suggests that this is mainly the result of the greater inclination of left-wing executives to participate in operations with inclusive goals. In contrast, right-wing governments were more likely to participate in operations with strategic goals than left-wing governments. Hereby, our analysis confirms the conclusions from recent case-based research that the context of an operation has an impact on the effect of executive ideology.

This article is structured as follows. The first section discusses the academic literature on the link between political partisanship and support for military operations. The second section elaborates on the research design, data sources, case selection, and analytical approach. The third section presents the results of the first part of

our analysis, which examines the relationship between party-political ideology and general positions toward military operations. The fourth section focuses on the link between government ideology and military deployment decisions. The fifth section discusses the results of the two parts of the analysis, after which the final section recapitulates the study's main conclusions and suggests areas for future research.

Party Politics and Security Policy

A large part of policy making in consolidated democracies is *party politics*. Hence, an extensive literature emerged that explores the link between political partisanship and domestic policy output, particularly on the issue of welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies (e.g., [Allan and Scruggs 2004](#); [Iversen and Stephens 2008](#); [Klitgaard, Schumacher, and Soentken 2015](#)). Studies in comparative politics largely support a policy-seeking conception of political parties, showing that parties articulate policy preferences that resonate with their political ideology, submit these to their constituencies through party manifestos, and seek to pass policy that matches their political preferences ([Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994](#)). In general, left parties typically underscore economic regulation, welfare state expansion, and a negative conception of the military, whereas right parties tend to stress free enterprise, a restriction of social services, and a positive conception of the military ([Budge and Klingemann 2001](#); [Volgens et al. 2013](#)).

By contrast, the study of international relations and foreign policy analysis were long characterized by the famous adage that “politics stops at the water’s edge,” which implied that there was no room for partisanship when it came to the national interest (see [Rathbun 2004](#)). This neorealist position was expressed, for instance, in [Gowa’s \(1998\)](#) analysis of US conflict involvement, where Gowa argues that “politics *does* stop at the water’s edge: the use of force abroad is invariant to both the domestic political calendar and the partisan composition of government” ([Gowa 1998](#), 307, original emphasis). However, when US Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg coined the phrase in 1947 as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, it was more of a plea than a fact (“we *must* stop politics at the water’s edge”) and since then, party differences over security policy have rather grown larger in the United States and elsewhere ([Lieber 2014](#)).

Notions of a broad party consensus on security matters have been challenged by an emerging literature that enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis to foreign and security policy. These studies report systematic differences between left and right parties on substantive questions regarding security policy and the use of force ([Palmer, Regan, and London 2004](#); [Arena and Palmer 2009](#); [Koch and Sullivan 2010](#); [Hofmann 2013](#); [Mello 2014](#); [Milner and Tingley 2015](#); [Stevens 2015](#); [Haesebrouck 2017](#); [Wagner et al. 2017](#)). [Hofmann \(2013\)](#), for example, shows in her study of the creation of European security institutions that partisanship shapes government preferences in security policy and that ideological congruence across governments fosters institution building. In their analysis of CHES data, [Wagner et al. \(2017, 2018\)](#) show that right political parties across Europe tend to be more supportive of military operations than their left counterparts. More specifically, their study finds a curvilinear relationship between support for peace and security operations and party positions on the left–right scale, indicating that parties at the far left and far right of the political spectrum are the least supportive of military operations.

Several studies examine whether party-political differences have an impact on military deployment decisions. [Palmer, Regan, and London \(2004, 16\)](#) demonstrate that right governments are more likely to become engaged in interstate conflict than left governments. Similar findings are reported in a subsequent study by [Arena and Palmer \(2009\)](#) for the period between 1960 and 1996. Studying the interaction between partisanship and public opinion, [Koch and Sullivan \(2010\)](#) find left governments to be more likely to end military engagements when public approval

declines, based on a data set of military interventions initiated by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States between 1960 and 2000.

Studies that build on expert survey data as well as large-N studies on the link between government ideology and military intervention, thus, provide evidence that right-leaning parties are more likely to support the use of force. Yet, the latter studies generally do not focus on the post-Cold War period, when the goals of military operations changed substantially. Moreover, neither research based on expert survey data nor the aforementioned quantitative studies examine whether the goals and the context of a military operation have an impact on the effect of government ideology. Research on specific military operations, however, suggests that the effects of partisanship do not apply equally to all cases of military deployment.

In their study of political support for the 2003 Iraq intervention, [Schuster and Maier \(2006\)](#) demonstrate that in Western Europe, right-wing governments tended to support the Iraq War while their left-leaning counterparts tended to oppose it, but similar patterns were not found in Central and Eastern Europe. [Mello \(2012\)](#) shows that these partisan differences also translated to war involvement in Iraq, where unified right governments were able to override institutional veto rights in several countries. [Mello \(2014\)](#) also demonstrates that right governments were more willing to engage militarily in the Kosovo conflict. In an extension of their argument about NATO operations in Afghanistan, [Auerswald and Saideman \(2014, 211\)](#) explore partisan patterns for the military intervention in Libya. Overall, they find left governments to have been more supportive of the air strikes, which they ascribe to the humanitarian and multilateral dimension of the mission. [Haesebrouck \(2017\)](#) provides a comprehensive analysis of the NATO operation in Libya across twenty-six countries and shows that left parties were more supportive than their right counterparts. However, in a study on the air strikes against Daesh, [Haesebrouck \(2018\)](#) finds no conclusive evidence that would support a partisan argument. Yet, this could be another indication that “political conflict does not arise equally over all types of military operations,” as argued by [Mello \(2014, 38\)](#).

These findings largely resonate with research conducted by [Rathbun \(2004, 2007\)](#), who reports significant differences between left and right parties in their conception of the national interest and particularly their support for military intervention. In an analysis of European participation in the operations in the Balkans, Rathbun introduced a three-dimensional model, which expects leftist parties to not only be more antimilitaristic, but also prefer pursuing their interests through multilateral frameworks and follow a more inclusive conception of the national interest ([Rathbun 2004, 18–21](#)). Rightist parties on the other hand have a narrower conception of the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in international relations, and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral institutions. In consequence, left-wing parties might actually be more supportive than right-wing parties of multilateral operations that pursue humanitarian goals in which there are no clear national interests at stake. According to [Rathbun \(2007\)](#), one of the reasons why leftist parties are generally more antimilitaristic is because they consider the use of force an act of subordination, which strengthens inequality between nations. [Haesebrouck \(2015\)](#) suggests that this is not the case for peacekeeping operations, which are deployed with the consent of local actors. In consequence, support for peacekeeping operations among left-wing governments can be expected to be stronger than support for humanitarian interventions.

While most studies focus on centrist parties, the results of the in-depth case studies by [Verbeek and Zaslove \(2015\)](#) as well as [Coticchia and Davidson \(2018\)](#) on the impact of radical parties on Italian foreign policy resonate with the findings of [Wagner et al. \(2017\)](#). However, [Verbeek and Zaslove \(2015\)](#) point out that the radical right Italian Northern league did in fact support the “War on Terror” and the deployment of Italian troops to Afghanistan. [Coticchia and Davidson \(2018\)](#), in turn, contend that radical left parties opposed military interventions in principle,

but they were not willing to force a government collapse in order to prevent the use of military force. These mixed findings suggest that the context of a military operation should not be neglected as it might explain why fringe parties support certain military operations but not others.

Few quantitative studies have examined the impact of far-right and far-left parties on military intervention. [Kaarbo and Beasley \(2008, 77\)](#) argue that coalition governments might be more extreme in their conflict-cooperation behavior because ideological outlier junior parties might hijack coalitions. In a subsequent study, they did not find evidence that the presence of junior partners resulted in more extreme foreign policy behavior ([Beasley and Kaarbo 2014](#)). While Beasley and Kaarbo do take into account the ideological position of junior parties, [Clare \(2010\)](#) shows in his study that governments with ideological outlier parties engage in more conflictual politics if the outlier party is farther to the right, and less conflictual politics if it is situated on the left.

While numerous studies have identified systematic differences over security policy between left and right parties, some research suggests that party positions on military interventions might not be adequately captured by the traditional left-right cleavage. [Wagner et al. \(2017\)](#) argue that diverging support for “wars of choice” might be more connected to cultural than socio-economic cleavages. To test this conjecture, they examine the link between support for military intervention and the new politics dimension of the CHES data ([Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002](#)), which ranges from green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN). Their analysis shows that support for military intervention declines at both ends of the scale. Yet, the actual impact of such cultural differences on government policy has not yet been examined.

In sum, there is cross-case and case-specific evidence to bolster the notion that right governments tend to be more supportive of military operations than left governments. However, previous research indicates that the effects of partisanship do not apply equally to all kinds of military operations.¹ While the right side of the political spectrum is generally expected to be more supportive of the military, there are specific reasons for the left to support military operations, especially military interventions that are justified on humanitarian grounds, as [Rathbun \(2004\)](#) has documented and subsequent studies have confirmed for operations in Libya and elsewhere ([Auerswald and Saideman 2014](#); [Haesebrouck 2017](#)). Yet, these conjectures have not yet been explored in a systematic fashion.

Based on this review, we expect to find systematic differences between left and right parties. Specifically, right parties are expected to be willing to use the military for defending more narrow national interests. Left parties, on the other hand, are expected to be reluctant to use military force for geostrategic purposes, preferring less coercive ways of conflict resolution instead. However, left-wing government might actually be more inclined to use military force than their right-leaning counterparts when humanitarian concerns are present, multilateral frameworks available, and narrowly defined interests are not at stake.

Methods and Data

Our analysis of political ideology and security policy follows a two-pronged research design. The first part of the empirical analysis explores the relationship between various alternative indicators of political partisanship and parties’ general support for military deployments to peace and security missions. This part seeks to shed light on the question whether there are generalizable patterns in the relationship between political ideology and security policy, and, if so, to what extent these are

¹ Recent studies also highlight the importance of coalition dynamics that can influence the formation and durability of multilateral military operations ([Mello and Saideman 2019](#)).

independent of questions of measurement and regional scope. The second part of the analysis investigates whether these empirical patterns also exist for the relationship between the “color” of a government and its decisions on *actual* military operations. In other words, when in power, are rightist parties more inclined to use military force than their leftist counterparts? Moreover, existing studies suggest that military operations should be differentiated by kind because governments may respond differently depending on their own circumstances, the kind of military operation, or the interests at stake.

To estimate party-political positions, we employ data from two widely used alternative sources: the 2010 and 2014 versions of the CHES (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017) and corresponding data from the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). As their names indicate, the CHES and CMP projects use different approaches to measure party-political positions. The CHES data are based on the judgment of academic experts, who have been asked to evaluate political parties on various policy issues and ideological dimensions, including “overall ideological stance” from extreme left to extreme right and the GAL/TAN scale, which seeks to cover a “social left–right dimension” (Bakker et al. 2015, 144), capturing parties’ views on civil rights and democratic freedoms. The GAL/TAN scale ranges from “Libertarian/Post-materialist” (0) to “Traditional/Authoritarian” (10).

In 2010 and 2014, the CHES survey further included a question about parties’ “position toward international security and peacekeeping,” asking respondents to rank the respective party on a scale from 0 (“Strongly favors COUNTRY troop deployment”) to 10 (“Strongly opposes COUNTRY troop deployment”). For the 2010 and 2014 CHES surveys, a total of 343 and 337 experts provided information on twenty-eight and thirty-one countries, respectively (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017).² While the CMP data also contain an aggregate measure of a party’s platform on the issue of “international peace,” the resulting scores tend to be low across the spectrum, which poses a problem for meaningful interpretation. Hence, for the first part of our analysis, we follow Wagner et al. (2017) in selecting the CHES variable “support for peace and security missions” as our dependent variable.³ Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the relevant variables from CHES 2010 and 2014 across twenty-eight countries.

Conversely, the CMP data originates from qualitative codings of party election programs across a wide range of policy domains. The CMP left–right scale results from aggregating twenty-six indicators, half of which are related to rightist parties, whereas the other half are associated with leftist parties. The scale ranges from –100 (most leftist) to +100 (most rightist), but most empirical cases are much closer to the center, falling into a range from –50 to +50. In order to cross-validate the two data sets on the left–right placement of political parties, table 2 shows the correlations between CMP and CHES left–right indicators. All three of these show strong correlations ($\rho \sim 0.600$) that are statistically significant at the $p < 0.0001$ level. This confirms that these two alternative measures of political partisanship arrive at generally similar, though not identical, estimates of party placement, a result that resonates with prior studies (cf. Bakker et al. 2015, 148–50).

For the involvement in military operations, we created an original data set that includes eight recent military operations: the Kosovo War (1999), Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001), the Iraq War (2003), EUFOR Congo (2006), UNIFIL II (2006), EUFOR Chad (2008), the Libya Intervention (2011), and the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) (2014). The selected

²For a detailed discussion of the general validity and reliability of CHES data, including question wording, see Hooghe et al. (2010). Bakker et al. (2015) provide an update for the 2010 CHES survey, including data on the standard deviation of experts’ placements by country.

³The original CHES variable “international security” runs from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates strong opposition to military deployments abroad. In line with Wagner et al. (2017), we have inverted this scale to have high positive scores indicate support for peace and security missions.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for CHES 2010 and 2014

Country	Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 and 2014			
	Number of political parties	Left–Right (mean)	GAL–TAN (mean)	Support for peace and security missions (mean)
Austria	13	5.985	5.626	4.122
Belgium	27	5.088	4.409	4.743
Bulgaria	21	5.844	6.322	4.451
Croatia	11	5.619	5.136	5.658
Cyprus	6	5.694	5.208	5.667
Czech Republic	16	5.470	5.228	5.319
Denmark	18	5.078	4.405	5.469
Estonia	12	5.566	4.738	7.292
Finland	16	5.321	4.916	4.844
France	22	5.234	5.065	4.946
Germany	16	5.219	5.054	4.443
Greece	16	4.954	5.337	4.080
Hungary	13	5.655	5.241	4.966
Ireland	13	3.795	4.168	4.006
Italy	27	4.592	4.851	4.987
Latvia	12	5.727	6.477	5.079
Lithuania	19	5.229	6.071	5.080
Luxembourg	6	4.500	2.833	6.500
Malta	2	5.750	3.500	4.167
Netherlands	21	5.262	4.978	5.143
Poland	16	5.790	5.965	4.867
Portugal	11	4.402	4.285	4.779
Romania	15	5.478	6.262	5.845
Slovenia	17	5.309	5.266	5.247
Slovakia	20	6.082	6.363	4.944
Spain	27	4.300	3.709	5.012
Sweden	20	5.397	4.098	5.249
United Kingdom	15	5.093	4.645	4.822
Total/mean	448	5.228	5.064	5.018

Note: “Support for Peace and Security Missions” has been recoded/inverted on the basis of the “International Security” variable.

Table 2. Correlations between CHES and CMP data sets

	CHES Left–Right (2010–2014)	
	Rho	<i>p</i> value
CMP Left–Right	0.600	0.000***
CMP Left–Right (Western Europe)	0.580	0.000***
CMP Left–Right (Eastern Europe)	0.605	0.000***

Note: *** = $p < .0001$.

operations vary considerably with regard to their goals, mandates, intensity, involvement of international organizations, and legality under international law. This variety not only enhances the inferential value of the analyses but also allows us to examine the impact of government ideology in different types of military operations.

As argued in the theory section, the context of the operation can be expected to have an impact on the link between government ideology and military participation. Whereas right-wing government might be more inclined to support operations deployed to defend narrow national interests, left-leaning executives

could be more supportive of operations with inclusive goals. Five of our military operations mainly pursued inclusive goals. The Kosovo War and the Libya intervention were humanitarian interventions—operations launched to protect civilians from mass atrocities. UNIFIL II and EUFOR's Congo and Chad can be categorized as peacekeeping operations, aimed to promote peace and stability. Three operations primarily pursued strategic goals. Operation Enduring Freedom and the operation against IS were launched as antiterrorist missions. The proclaimed goal of the Iraq War was to respond to a security threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, allegedly developed by the regime of Saddam Hussein.

With regard to countries, the second part of our analysis focuses on twenty-four EU member states. Given that the main element of the Kosovo War, Libya Intervention, and anti-IS coalition was air strikes, countries without fighter jets were not included as cases for these operations.⁴ Because of its opt-out in the European Defence and Security Policy, Denmark is excluded for EUFOR's Congo and Chad. Romania and Bulgaria are not included as cases for EUFOR Chad because they only joined the EU in 2007. This results in a sample of 173 country–operation dyads. The dependent variable, military participation, is operationalized dichotomously. Our codings are based on Haesebrouck (2017, 2018) and Mello (2014). Seventy-five of our country–operation dyads were coded 1 on military participation; 98 were coded 0.

In line with the first part of our analysis, ideology is operationalized with the CHES and CMP left–right indicators and the CHES GAL/TAN measure. Party positions (n) are aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party's (i) ideological position (ip), weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{s_i ip_i}{s}.$$

Table 3 provides an overview of the examined military operations and the mean ideological position across the observed governments. Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides further details of the examined operations and an overview of the participating and non-participating states. The relationship between government ideology and military participation is assessed with Spearman's rank correlation coefficients and visualized with box plots.

Support for Peace and Security Missions

Figure 1 shows the relationship between party ideology on a left–right scale and a party's position toward peace and security missions. This figure is based on CHES data from the 2010 and 2014 surveys (Bakker et al. 2015), including 448 political parties from twenty-eight EU member states. The x -axis displays CHES left–right scores, ranging from extreme left (0) to extreme right (10). The y -axis refers to a party's general support for their country's troop deployments in peace and security missions. A score of 10 indicates strong support, whereas a score of 0 denotes strong opposition to such military deployments. Blue points refer to Western European parties, whereas red points indicate parties from Eastern Europe.

Based on a quadratic function, the solid line shows that the relationship between party ideology and support for military missions is curvilinear. Far-left parties are least supportive of military missions, whereas center–right parties are most supportive, and support decreases again as one moves to the far-right end of the political

⁴ According to the IISS (2014) military balance, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovenia do not have fighter jets.

Table 3. Military operations and party ideology

Country	Military operation	Timeframe	Type	Military participants	Military non-participants
Kosovo	Allied Force	03/1999–06/1999	Humanitarian intervention	Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom	Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden
Afghanistan	Enduring Freedom	10/2001–ongoing	Strategic operation	Denmark, France, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, United Kingdom	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
Iraq	Iraqi Freedom	03/2003–08/2010	Strategic operation	Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden
Congo	EUFOR Congo	07/2006–11/2006	Peacekeeping operation	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom
Lebanon	UNIFIL II	08/2006–ongoing	Peacekeeping operation	Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom
Chad/CAR	EUFOR Chad	01/2008–03/2009	Peacekeeping operation	Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom
Libya	Unified Protector	03/2011–10/2011	Humanitarian intervention	Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom	Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia
Iraq/Syria	Inherent Resolve	08/2014–ongoing	Strategic operation	Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom	Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden

spectrum. The quadratic model is statistically highly significant ($p < 0.0001$) with an R^2 of 0.4089.⁵ Going beyond the analysis of Wagner et al. (2017, 2018), figure 1

⁵ By comparison, the linear model is also statistically highly significant ($p < 0.0001$), but with an R^2 of only 0.2214 it covers much less variance. To check whether it is appropriate to describe the empirical relationship as curvilinear, we have also conducted the “two-line” approach, suggested by Simonsohn (2018). The results show that there are statistically significant positive and negative slopes with a sign change at an x -value of 7.13.




Figure 1. Party ideology (CHES Left–Right) and position toward peace and security missions

also shows the difference between parties in Western and Eastern Europe with regard to their support for peace and security missions. Apart from the fact that there are fewer far-left parties in Eastern Europe and more far-right parties, the distribution is similar to that in Western Europe. The curvilinear pattern holds also when analyzing Eastern and Western European subsets of the data. However, as expected, the effect of party ideology on support for military missions is stronger among Western European parties. While the quadratic model is statistically highly significant for both Eastern and Western European subsets ($p < 0.0001$), for Western parties R^2 is 0.5604 and for Eastern parties R^2 is only 0.1738.

In summary, the CHES data thus supports the notion that parties on the political right are generally more supportive of military operations than leftist parties. This can be seen from the curve, which reaches its peak among center–right parties (scores between 6 and 7). Moreover, all parties on the far left (scores below 2) oppose military deployments for peace and security missions. However, contrary to expectations of a linear relationship between partisanship and political support for military missions, the data also show that there is curvilinearity, confirming the results of Wagner et al. (2017, 2018). This means that parties in the political center are substantially more supportive than parties on the ends of the political




Figure 2. Party ideology (CHES GAL/TAN) and position toward peace and security missions

spectrum. This is an important finding because it qualifies expectations that are still widely found in the literature, namely, that the more to the right political parties are, the more they will be in favor of military measures. While this is true for the political spectrum in the center, far-right parties are substantially less supportive of peace and security missions. Finally, while the results for both Eastern and Western Europe are statistically significant, the smaller effect in Eastern Europe resonates with findings from prior studies that have shown political ideology to be less consequential as a predictor in Eastern Europe, arguably because of differences in the consolidation of the party systems (Schuster and Maier 2006; Mello 2014).

Using an alternative measure of political ideology, figure 2 replaces the CHES left–right position with the “new politics” dimension (GAL/TAN) from the CHES data set, which ranges from libertarian/post-materialist (0) to traditional/authoritarian (10). The plot confirms the curvilinear relationship identified by Wagner et al. (2017, 2018) between party position and support for peace and security missions. For the GAL/TAN dimension, the peak is close to the ideological center and it declines almost equally on both ends. This means that parties are less supportive of military missions the more pronounced their ideological position on the new politics dimension is, irrespective of whether these are near the




Figure 3. Party ideology (CMP Left–Right) and position toward peace and security missions

libertarian/post-materialist pole (e.g., the Portuguese *Bloco de Esquerda*) or close to the traditional/authoritarian extreme (e.g., the Bulgarian *Ataka*). The quadratic model is statistically highly significant ($p < 0.0001$) with an R^2 of 0.1286. This pattern also holds when the data is split into Western and Eastern European subsets of Eastern and Western European parties. Both of these are statistically highly significant ($p < 0.0001$).⁶ Nonetheless, the comparatively low R^2 means that the GAL/TAN dimension accounts for less variation than the CHES left–right scale.

As a robustness test, we also examine whether the identified pattern holds when replacing the CHES left–right scores with another estimate of party positions. Figure 3 exchanges the CHES data with respective left–right scores from the CMP data set (Volkens et al. 2013). This is based on a consolidated data file with 261 political parties from twenty-six EU member states, for the period from 2008 to 2016. The data combine the CHES scores for the support of peace and security missions from the 2010 and 2014 CHES surveys with CMP party ideology data based on election programs. The 2010 CHES scores were assigned to CMP parties from July 2008 through June 2012, whereas the 2014 CHES scores were assigned to CMP

⁶The linear model is also statistically significant, but only at the $p < 0.05$ level with an R^2 of 0.01392.




Figure 4. Party family (CHES) and position toward peace and security missions

parties from July 2012 through June 2016. The figure shows that the previously identified pattern between support for peace and security missions and political partisanship is not an artifact of the CHES data. To the contrary, a similar curvilinear relationship is also found for the CMP data and the relationship is also statistically highly significant ($p < 0.0001$) with an R^2 of 0.1167. Parties on the political right tend to provide more support to peace and security missions than parties on the left, but this support drops as one moves into the far-right spectrum of parties.

Apart from using left–right estimates of party positions, parties can be classified according to their party family. Figure 4 displays a box plot of an ANOVA analysis for party family (aligned on a left–right scale) and position toward peace and security missions. This analysis draws on a total of 219 political parties, as opposed to 161 included in Wagner et al. (2017), because we include both CHES surveys from 2010 and 2014. Moreover, we distinguish between Eastern and Western European parties. The figure shows, for instance, that radical left parties are a Western European phenomenon and that there are only two parties in Eastern Europe classified as such. That being said, our analysis arrives at results similar to Wagner et al. (2017), confirming the curvilinear relationship, where support for peace and security missions is strong among centrist parties and increases the further to the right a political party stands, but drops for parties on the ends of the spectrum (Radical Left, Greens, and Radical Right parties). Notably, though, the results are not statistically significant for Eastern European parties.

Table 4 summarizes the ANOVA analysis of support for peace and security missions by party family for the entire data set and divided into Western and Eastern Europe. The results confirm that substantive differences exist between political parties and their positions on security policy. Clearly, Conservatives and Christian Democrats are most supportive of military measures in terms of deployments for peace and security missions, followed by Liberals and Socialists. Support drops substantially toward the political extremes: the Radical Left and the Radical Right are the two party families that are least supportive of military missions. For our data, the results are even more pronounced than those reported by Wagner et al. (2017). Whereas the latter report a mean of 6.063 for Conservatives and Christian

Table 4. ANOVA analysis of support for peace and security missions by party family (CHES)

Party family	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Western and Eastern Europe***					
Radical Left	24	2.189	1.115	0.9	4.6
Greens	23	4.284	0.905	2.7	6.1
Socialists	45	5.722	1.298	1.8	8.6
Liberals	41	6.020	1.096	4.4	8.9
Conservatives and Christian	59	6.428	1.040	4.3	9.0
Democrats					
Radical Right	27	3.539	1.477	0.8	5.7
Western Europe***					
Radical Left	22	2.251	1.146	0.9	4.6
Greens	15	3.934	0.826	2.7	5.0
Socialists	29	5.709	1.346	1.8	8.5
Liberals	21	6.290	0.969	4.8	8.5
Conservatives and Christian	32	6.540	0.817	4.8	8.5
Democrats					
Radical Right	16	4.343	0.944	2.5	5.7
Eastern Europe ***					
Radical Left	2	1.510	0.103	1.4	1.6
Greens	8	4.940	0.676	3.9	6.1
Socialists	16	5.745	1.248	3.7	8.6
Liberals	20	5.737	1.172	4.4	8.9
Conservatives and Christian	27	6.295	1.258	4.3	9.0
Democrats					
Radical Right	11	2.369	1.341	0.8	5.6

Note: *** $p < 0.0001$.

Democrats, we find a mean of 6.428 for this party family and the scores for Radical Left and Radical Right are both lower than those in [Wagner et al. \(2017\)](#), which means that there is an even stronger curvilinear relationship.

Support for Specific Military Operations

The second part of our analysis focuses on the link between government ideology and participation in the eight military operations. The relationship is assessed with Spearman's rank correlation coefficients. This non-parametric statistic does not require assumptions of normally distributed data or random selection. The differences between military participants and non-participants are visualized with box plots. The latter allow to straightforwardly examine the distribution of party positions of the governments of participating and non-participating countries. First, all operations are examined across the different indicators of ideology. Subsequently, the analyses examine whether the context of the operation has an impact on the relationship between ideology and military participation. Lastly, different groups of member states are examined.

[Table 5](#) presents Spearman's rank correlations between different measures of government ideology and military participation in the operations under investigation. The analysis of all countries across all operations suggests that there is no significant relation between the CHES indicators and military participation, while there is only a weak and negative correlation with the CMP left-right indicator. [Figure 5](#) displays a box plot that visualizes the latter relation. The box plot does not suggest strong differences between the ideological orientation of the governments that decided to participate in an operation and governments that decided not to participate, although the CMP scores of the cases of military participation are somewhat lower.

Table 5. Correlations between party ideology and participation in military operations

	CMP Left–Right		CHES Left–Right		CHES GAL/TAN	
	Rho	<i>p</i> value	Rho	<i>p</i> value	Rho	<i>p</i> value
All countries						
All operations	–0.147	0.053	–0.066	0.388	–0.019	0.807
Strategic goals	0.093	0.456	–0.054	0.666	–0.033	0.794
Inclusive goals	–0.25	0.01	–0.095	0.334	0.022	0.821
Humanitarian intervention	–0.183	0.272	–0.192	0.248	0.123	0.464
Peacekeeping operation	–0.289	0.017	–0.023	0.851	–0.043	0.729
Eastern Europe						
All operations	–0.302	0.014	–0.127	0.31	0.16	0.2
Strategic goals	–0.256	0.207	–0.334	0.096	–0.156	0.448
Inclusive goals	–0.228	0.158	0.213	0.187	0.415	0.008
Humanitarian intervention	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peacekeeping operation	–0.184	0.35	0.323	0.094	0.5	0.007
Western Europe						
All operations	–0.042	0.667	–0.001	0.993	–0.037	0.704
Strategic goals	0.244	0.124	0.094	0.558	0.064	0.69
Inclusive goals	–0.064	0.608	–0.034	0.787	–0.049	0.695
Humanitarian intervention	0.033	0.872	0.067	0.746	0.294	0.144
Peacekeeping operation	–0.125	0.442	–0.125	0.442	–0.321	0.044
Small countries						
All operations	–0.374	0.001	–0.184	0.104	–0.015	0.896
Strategic goals	–0.22	0.234	–0.272	0.139	–0.142	0.445
Inclusive goals	–0.462	0.001	–0.111	0.451	0.139	0.347
Humanitarian intervention	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peacekeeping operation	–0.571	0	–0.043	0.808	0.201	0.255
Large countries						
All operations	0.007	0.95	0.042	0.686	0.041	0.692
Strategic goals	0.283	0.095	0.089	0.606	0.03	0.864
Inclusive goals	–0.074	0.582	0.015	0.91	0.162	0.226
Humanitarian intervention	–0.097	0.651	0	1	0.452	0.027
Peacekeeping operation	0	1	0.055	0.757	–0.118	0.506

Note. None of the small or Eastern European countries participated in one of the humanitarian interventions.

This indicates that left-leaning governments were more inclined to actually participate in the operations under investigation than their right-leaning counterparts.

These counterintuitive results might be related to the fact that the impact of ideology on foreign policy preferences depends on the type of military operation. As argued in the theory section, left-leaning governments might be more inclined to support operations with inclusive goals. In contrast, right-wing governments could be more supportive of operations that are launched to defend narrower national interests. In line with the results across all operations, there are only significant correlations for the CMP left–right indicator. Figure 6 visualizes the relation between government ideology operationalized with the CMP indicator and participation in different types of operations. In line with theoretical expectations, the box plot shows that the countries that participated in operations with inclusive goals were generally governed by left-leaning parties. The conclusion that left-leaning governments were more inclined to participate in operations with inclusive goals than their right-leaning counterparts is confirmed by the negative Kendall rank correlation coefficient. However, the differences are more significant in the set of peacekeeping operations than in the set of humanitarian interventions. The Spearman's rank coefficients are negative in both types of operations, but the correlation




Figure 5. Government ideology (CMP) and participation in military operations

is only significant for peacekeeping operations.⁷ In contrast, there is no significant correlation between government ideology and military participation in operations with strategic goals.

Subsequently, different groups of member states were examined. First, the analysis examines whether there are differences between the member states with

⁷ Figure A1 in the Online Appendix visualizes the differences between humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations.




Figure 6. Government ideology (CMP) and military participation: inclusive versus strategic goals

(relatively) small and large military capabilities.⁸ The results presented in [table 5](#) indicate that left-wing governments were more inclined to participate in military operations than right-wing governments: there is a significant negative correlation between the CMP left–right indicator and military participation among the small member states. The differences are even more pronounced when looking at different types of operations.⁹ For the large member states, there is a significant positive correlation between government ideology and military participation for operations with strategic goals and no significant correlation for operations that pursue

⁸The average military spending between 2005 and 2014, retrieved from [SIPRI \(2018\)](#), was used to operationalize military capabilities, with the median used as threshold to distinguish between small and large states.

⁹Figure A2 in the Online Appendix visualizes the differences between different types of operations.

inclusive goals. In contrast, for the small member states a significant negative correlation exists for operations with inclusive goals, but there is no significant correlation for strategic operations. This suggests that humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are likely to be subject to political conflict in the smaller member states, but not in the larger states. The results support the hypothesis that right-leaning governments are more inclined to participate in strategic operations. The absence of support for this hypothesis in small states might be explained by the fact that these often lack the military capabilities to participate in these generally larger operations, resulting in non-significant findings. In fact, only seven small states participated in strategic operations.

Second, we focus on differences between Eastern and Western European states. The results show a significant negative correlation between the CMP right-left indicator and military participation among Eastern European states, indicating that left-wing governments were more likely to participate in operations than right-leaning governments, while no significant correlation was found among Western European states. In contrast to the results of the first part of our analysis, this suggests that partisanship patterns are more pronounced in Eastern Europe. However, given that nine out of ten Eastern European states are in the group of small states, this might also be an artifact of the differences between large and small states. Lastly, the analysis also shows contradictory results for the GAL/TAN indicator.¹⁰ The significant negative correlation between this indicator and military participation in peacekeeping operations among Western European States indicates that libertarian/post-materialist executives are more inclined to participate in these operations. In contrast, the significant positive correlation among Eastern European states suggests that traditional/authoritarian governments were more likely to provide military contributions to peacekeeping operations.

Discussion

Although the study of domestic politics is constitutive to foreign policy analysis and political parties are an essential part of the domestic politics of democracies, party politics has long been neglected in the study of foreign policy (cf. introduction to this special issue). The results of the analyses presented in this paper suggest that party politics has an impact on foreign policy decisions, but that the traditional distinction between a “pro-peace left” and a “pro-military right” does not suffice for explaining military deployment decisions of modern democracies.

The first part of our analysis, which examines the relationship between political ideology and support for peace and security operations as indicated in the CHES database, suggests that right-leaning parties are more in favor of troop deployments. However, the relationship between party ideology and support for military missions is curvilinear, which implies that parties in the political center are more supportive of troop deployments than extreme left and extreme right parties. Likewise, parties on both ends of the GAL/TAN scale are less supportive of military missions, irrespective of whether they are located close to the libertarian/post-materialist pole or the traditional/authoritarian extreme. Still, the new politics dimension accounts for less variation in support for military deployment than the traditional left-right difference. Generally, the results of the first part of the analysis confirm the conclusions of prior research: party-political differences regarding military deployments are structured around the right-left axis, with right-leaning parties being more supportive of military operations than left-wing parties (cf. *inter alia* [Arena and Palmer 2009](#); [Palmer, Regan, and London 2004](#); [Wagner et al. 2017, 2018](#)).

¹⁰ Figure A3 in the Online Appendix visualizes this relationship.

The second part of our analysis, however, suggests that the relationship between political ideology and military deployment is more complex than suggested by the binary distinction between the pro-military right and the pro-peace left. Our analysis did not provide convincing evidence that right-wing governments were more inclined to participate in the eight military operations under investigation. In fact, the results suggest that left-leaning governments were actually more likely to participate in military operations. This indicates that the stronger support of rightist parties for troop deployment does not translate into a greater inclination of right-wing governments to deploy forces.

A conceivable explanation for these diverging results could be that the correlation between the CHES left-right indicator and the “support for peace and security missions” measure is an artifact of how the former is constructed. More specifically, experts might take a party’s position toward peace and security operations into account when they judge its overall “ideological stance.” However, a party’s position on the left-right axis is determined by a wide range of factors, most importantly their position toward socio-economic issues. Moreover, the relationship is also found when using the CMP left-right measure, of which only two out of twenty-six categories are related to a party’s general attitude toward the military. In consequence, the strong correlation between a party’s ideological position and its attitude toward peace and security operations cannot be fully attributed to the potential conceptual overlap between the variables.

Another possible explanation is related to a general disadvantage of expert survey data: party positions are generally based on long-run party reputations (Klingemann et al. 2006, 64). The large-N studies on the link between the use of force and executive ideology that focus on the Cold War period provide evidence that right-leaning parties are more likely to support the use of force (Palmer, Regan, and London 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009). As argued in the theory section, recent case-based research shows that the link between party-politics and military deployment has been affected by changes in goals and mandates of military operations following the end of the Cold War (Rathbun 2004). However, given that “expert surveys lack a dynamic quality,” the scores on “the support for peace and security missions” measure might reflect the political party’s reputation rather than their current positions toward military deployment (Klingemann et al. 2006, 64).

The most important limitation of the “the support for peace and security missions” indicator is that it measures the general support of a political party for troop deployments in peace and security operations, without differentiating between types of operations. The second part of our analysis confirms conclusions from previous case-based studies that the link between military deployment and party-politics depends on the context of the operation. More specifically, the results show that right-wing governments were only more inclined to participate in strategic operations. Left-leaning governments were more likely to participate in operations with inclusive goals. This is especially the case in peacekeeping operations.

Case-based evidence from the operations under investigation supports this conclusion. Rathbun’s study (2004, 46), for example, suggests that the vehement advocacy of the British government for a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is best explained by the leftist ideology of Tony Blair’s Labour party, which “considered upholding human rights as part of the national interest.” Likewise, Auerswald and Saideman (2014, 211) conclude that the left-wing governments of Belgium, Denmark, and Norway were “at least partially motivated” by humanitarian beliefs when they decided to participate in the Libya operation. This contrasts sharply with Italy’s right-wing Berlusconi government’s policy toward the Libyan crisis, which only decided to contribute to the operation to preserve its economic interests (Lombardi 2011). Haesebrouck (2015) shows that, in the absence such interests, only left-wing coalitions made a substantial contribution to the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL. Fonck, Haesebrouck, and Reykers (2019), in turn, demonstrate that

right-wing members of the Belgian parliament more strongly emphasized the threat posed by IS to Belgian security during debates on participating in the air strikes against the terrorist group, suggesting that right-leaning parties accord more importance to national interests.

Conclusion

Are there genuine ideological differences between political parties on issues related to the use of force in international relations? And how do such differences influence decisions on participation in military operations? This paper provided a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between party-political ideology, their position toward peace and security missions, and their actual deployments in military operations between 1999 and 2014. The results of the analysis presented in this paper suggest essential differences between the general position of political parties on peace and security missions, on the one hand, and the impact of party-political ideology on military deployment decisions, on the other hand.

In the first part of our analysis, we examined the relationship between political ideology and the general support for peace and security operations as indicated in the CHES database. The results provide strong support for the first hypothesis of the introduction to this special issue (Raunio and Wagner 2020), which expects right-leaning parties to be more supportive of military operations. Yet, the results also show that the empirical pattern is *curvilinear*: centrist and center-right parties witness the highest level of support for military missions, while parties on both ends of the political spectrum show substantially less support. This result resonates with recent studies (Wagner et al. 2017, 2018).

Importantly, the stronger support of rightist parties for peace and security missions does *not* translate into a greater inclination of right-wing governments to actually deploy forces for military operations. The second part of our analysis suggests that leftist governments were actually more inclined to participate in operations than their right-leaning counterparts, although the effect is small when all operations are included in the analysis. Examining different types of military operations suggests that this is mainly the result of the greater inclination of left-wing executives to participate in operations with inclusive goals, such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. In fact, right-leaning governments were more inclined to participate in strategic operations. While the analysis, thus, does not support hypothesis six of the introductory article (which expects left governments to be less inclined to use military force), it does provide evidence for the proposition that political ideology does not have the same impact on all types of military intervention (Raunio and Wagner 2020). In contrast to the second hypothesis, the results suggest that party-political differences remain relevant for more humanitarian operations (in this collection, see also Pennings 2020).

More generally, the results of our analysis demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between different types of military operations when examining party-political positions on military deployments. Neither research based on expert surveys nor previous quantitative analyses of the link between government ideology and military deployment decisions consider the substantial differences between military operations, which might explain the reason why they consistently confirm that right-wing parties are more inclined to support the use of force. Our study clearly shows how important it is to differentiate between military operations to arrive at a more complete and nuanced understanding of the link between party-politics and military deployments.

Supplemental Information

Supplemental information is available in the *Foreign Policy Analysis* data archive.

References

- ALLAN, JAMES P., AND LYLE SCRUGGS. 2004. "Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 496–512.
- ARENA, PHILIP, AND GLENN PALMER. 2009. "Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (4): 955–75.
- AUERSWALD, DAVID P., AND STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN. 2014. *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- BAKKER, RYAN, CATHERINE DE VRIES, ERICA EDWARDS, LIESBET HOOOGHE, SETH JOLLY, GARY MARKS, AND JONATHAN POLK et al. 2015. "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010." *Party Politics* 21 (1): 143–52.
- BEASLEY, RYAN K., AND JULIET KAARBO. 2014. "Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (4): 729–40.
- BUDGE, IAN, AND HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN. 2001. "Finally! Comparative Over-Time Mapping of Party Policy Movement." In *Mapping Policy Preferences*, edited by Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19–50.
- BUDGE, IAN, HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN, ANDREA VOLKENS, JUDITH BARA, AND ERIC TANENBAUM, eds. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CLARE, JOE. 2010. "Ideological Fractionalization and the International Conflict Behavior of Parliamentary Democracies." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (4): 965–87.
- COTICCHIA, FABRIZIO, AND JASON W. DAVIDSON. 2018. "The Limits of Radical Parties in Coalition Foreign Policy: Italy, Hijacking, and the Extremity Hypothesis." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14 (2): 149–68.
- FONCK, DAAN, TIM HAESBROUCK, AND YF REYKERS. 2019. "Parliamentary Involvement, Party Ideology and Majority-Opposition Bargaining: Belgian Participation in Multinational Military Operations." *Contemporary Security Policy* 40 (1): 85–100.
- GOWA, JOANNE S. 1998. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad." *International Organization* 52 (2): 307–24.
- HAESBROUCK, TIM. 2015. "Democratic Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations. A Two-Step Fuzzy Set QCA of UNIFIL II." *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 15 (1): 4–51.
- . 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (10): 2235–61.
- . 2018. "Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes against Islamic State: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14 (2): 254–75.
- HOFMANN, STEPHANIE C. 2013. *European Security in NATO's Shadow: Party Ideologies and Institution Building*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HOOOGHE, LIESBET, RYAN BAKKER, ANNA BRIGEVICH, CATHERINE DE VRIES, ERICA EDWARDS, GARY MARKS, AND JAN ROVNY et al. 2010. "Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning." *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (5): 687–703.
- HOOOGHE, LIESBET, GARY MARKS, AND CAROLE J. WILSON. 2002. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (8): 965–89.
- INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES. 2014. *The Military Balance 2014*. London: IISS.
- IVERSEN, TORBEN, AND JOHN D. STEPHENS. 2008. "Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Human Capital Formation." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 600–637.
- KAARBO, JULIET, AND RYAN K. BEASLEY. 2008. "Taking It to the Extreme: The Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (1): 67–81.
- KLINGEMANN, HANS-DIETER, RICHARD I. HOFFERBERT, AND IAN BUDGE. 1994. *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- KLINGEMANN, HANS-DIETER, ANDREA VOLKENS, JUDITH BARA, IAN BUDGE, AND MICHAEL McDONALD, eds. 2006. *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KLITGAARD, MICHAEL BAGGESEN, GIJS SCHUMACHER, AND MENNO SOENTKEN. 2015. "The Partisan Politics of Institutional Welfare State Reform." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22 (7): 948–66.
- KOCH, MICHAEL T., AND PATRICIA SULLIVAN. 2010. "Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions." *The Journal of Politics* 72 (3): 616–29.
- LIEBER, ROBERT J. 2014. "Politics Stops at the Water's Edge? Not Recently." *The Washington Post*, February 10.
- LOMBARDI, BEN. 2011. "The Berlusconi Government and Intervention in Libya." *The International Spectator* 46 (4): 31–44.

- MELLO, PATRICK A. 2012. "Parliamentary Peace or Partisan Politics? Democracies' Participation in the Iraq War." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 15 (3): 420–53.
- . 2014. *Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MELLO, PATRICK A., AND STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN. 2019. "The Politics of Multinational Military Operations." *Contemporary Security Policy* 40 (1): 30–37.
- MILNER, HELEN V., AND DUSTIN TINGLEY. 2015. *Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- PALMER, GLENN, PATRICK M. REGAN, AND TAMAR R. LONDON. 2004. "What's Stopping You? The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies." *International Interactions* 30 (1): 1–24.
- PENNINGS, PAUL. 2020. "Trends in the Partisan Positions on Internationalism and Defence in Europe, 1945–2016." Unpublished manuscript.
- POLK, JONATHAN, JAN ROVNY, RYAN BAKKER, ERICA EDWARDS, LIESBET HOOGHE, SETH JOLLY, AND JELLE KOEDAM et al. 2017. "Explaining the Salience of Anti-Elitism and Reducing Political Corruption for Political Parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data." *Research & Politics* 4 (1): 1–9.
- RATHBUN, BRIAN C. 2004. *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2007. "Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad: Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (3): 379–407.
- RAUNIO, TAPIO, AND WOLFGANG WAGNER. 2020. "The Party Politics of Foreign and Security Policy in Europe and Beyond." Unpublished manuscript.
- SCHUSTER, JÜRGEN, AND HERBERT MAIER. 2006. "The Rift: Explaining Europe's Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on Iraq." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2 (3): 223–44.
- SIMONSOHN, URI. 2018. "Two Lines: A Valid Alternative to the Invalid Testing of U-Shaped Relationships with Quadratic Regressions." *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science* 1 (4): 538–55.
- SIPRI. 2018. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
- STEVENS, DANIEL. 2015. "War and Elections." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (3): 477–89.
- VERBEEK, BERTJAN, AND ANDREJ ZASLOVE. 2015. "The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Foreign Policy: The Northern League as a Junior Coalition Partner in the Berlusconi Governments." *European Political Science Review* 7 (4): 525–46.
- VOLKENS, ANDREA, JUDITH BARA, IAN BUDGE, AND MICHAEL D. McDONALD, eds. 2013. *Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts III*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- WAGNER, WOLFGANG, ANNA HERRANZ-SURRALLÉS, JULIET KAARBO, AND FALK OSTERMANN. 2017. "The Party Politics of Legislative–Executive Relations in Security and Defence Policy." *West European Politics* 40 (1): 20–41.
- . 2018. "Party Politics at the Water's Edge: Contestation of Military Operations in Europe." *European Political Science Review* 10 (4): 537–63.